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Abstract
This paper shows that whether natural resources are good or bad for a country’s
development crucially depends on the interaction between institutional setting and
the type of resources possessed by the country. Some natural resources are, for
economical and technical reasons, more likely to cause problems such as rent-seeking
and conﬂicts than others. This potential problem can, however, be countered by
good institutional quality. In contrast to the traditional resource curse hypothesis,
we show the impact of natural resources on economic growth to be non-monotonic
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11 Introduction
A major puzzle in economic development is the existence of a negative correlation between
economic growth and large natural resources. Some of the fastest growing economies over
the last few decades are countries with very little natural wealth (such as Hong Kong,
Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan), whereas some of the poorest economic performers (like
Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo) are countries with enormous
resources. A number of recent studies have concluded that the negative relationship
between resource abundance and growth also holds for large samples of countries after
controlling for other relevant characteristics.1 This relationship, the so called ’resource
curse’, has become widely accepted as one of the stylized facts of our times.2
However, the resource curse seems far from inevitable. While oil appears to have been
the cause of recurrent problems in countries like Venezuela and Ecuador, Norway has
become one of the world’s richest economies largely thanks to its oil endowments. The
possession of diamonds has arguably been disastrous for the development of countries
like Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, this does
not seem be the case in countries like Australia, South Africa or Botswana – one of the
world’s fastest growing economies over the past thirty years. There are several examples
of countries rich in similar resources that have experienced extremely diﬀerent economic
growth. Studying the examples in Table 1, it seems that for every catastrophic failure
there is a counter example of success.
In this paper, we show that the eﬀect of natural resources on economic development
is not determined by resource endowments alone, but rather by the interaction between
the type of resources that a country possesses, and the quality of its institutions. This
combination of factors determines what we call the appropriability of a resource. The
concept of appropriability captures the likelihood that natural resources lead to rent-
1E.g. Sachs and Warner (1995); Gylfason et al. (1999); Leite and Weidmann (1999). Ross (1999)
provides an overview of much of this literature.
2Wright (2001, p. 1)
2seeking, corruption or conﬂicts which, in turn, harm economic development. We will
show that in countries where resources are highly appropriable - as determined by the
type of resources as well as institutional quality - resource abundance is problematic,
while in countries where resources are less appropriable, they can contribute to economic
growth.
Table 1: Relative growth performance in ten resource rich economies
Growth Main resourcea Institutional
1975-1998 qualityb
Botswana 4.99 Diamonds 0.706
Chile 3.71 Copper 0.668
Norway 2.82 Crude Petrol 0.966
Australia 1.97 Minerals 0.932
Canada 1.73 Minerals 0.974
Sample Average 1.53 0.638
Ecuador -0.79 Crude Petrol 0.592
Niger -1.45 Minerals 0.520
Zambia -1.94 Copper 0.434
Sierra Leone -2.05 Diamonds 0.406
Congo, Democratic Rep. -5.39 Ores and Metals 0.232
a The listing of main resources is based on UNCTAD data on export structure in 1975.
b The measure of institutional quality is a ”Property Rights Index” based on data from
Keefer and Knack (2002). The index score for a country is between zero and one where
higher scores mean better institutional quality. See Appendix Table A2 for details.
It is important to stress the two dimensions of our concept. On the one hand, cer-
tain resources are, by their physical and economical characteristics, more likely to cause
appropriative behavior. Resources which are very valuable, can be stored, are easily
transported (or smuggled), and are easily sold are, for obvious reasons, more attractive
to anyone interested in short-term illegitimate gains. This suggests that resources such
as diamonds or precious metals are more problematic than, say, agricultural products.3
On the other hand, this does not mean that all countries with potentially problematic
types of resources will suﬀer, while others will do ﬁne. The potential problem of having
certain types of resources can be countered by having good institutions. Given the right
3Indeed, many case studies of development failure and resource abundance are concerned with mineral
rich countries, rather than countries rich in natural resources in general. Campbell (2002) deals with
conﬂict diamonds, Karl (1997) gives examples of problems related to oil, and Auty (1993) studies countries
dependent on non-ferrous metals.
3institutional framework, ﬁnding oil or diamonds has the potential of boosting a coun-
try’s economic development, while the same resources are likely to lead to problems in a
country with poor institutions.
Consider the cases of Ecuador and Norway: in 1967 and 1969, respectively, these coun-
tries discovered unexpectedly vast amounts of oil, which have ever since constituted an
important share of their GDP.4 In terms of institutional setting, however, these countries
were very diﬀerent. Ecuador had just ended a short period of military government, which
was to return in 1972. Norway on the other hand was one of the worlds oldest democracies
with ﬁrmly established institutions. At the time of the oil discoveries, the institutional
gap between Ecuador and Norway was thus deﬁnitely to Ecuador’s disadvantage. Accord-
ing to the hypothesis suggested in this paper, Ecuador would be expected to have more
diﬃculties than Norway in transforming the oil revenues into long-term development. In
the past decades the yearly growth rate of the Norwegian economy has been on average
seven times higher than that of Ecuador.
Diamonds perhaps stand out as the most potentially problematic type of resources
in their extreme value (per unit) and the ease with which they can be smuggled. When
it comes to the ease of extraction, it is important to distinguish between primary (kim-
berlitic) diamonds, which require costly mining technology, and secondary (alluvial) di-
amonds, for which the extraction costs are virtually zero. Mining of primary diamonds
requires large investments and therefore good property rights protection is essential for
such investments to be undertaken. The insecure property rights in a country like Tan-
zania, which is known to have large amounts of kimberlitic pipe, have made it diﬃcult
to attract investors and therefore this natural endowment has not enhanced its economic
growth. On the other hand, a country like Botswana, which has a higher institutional
quality than the world average, has successfully exploited its kimberlitic diamond re-
sources over the past thirty years. The same is true for Australia, which quickly managed
4According to our own calculations based on ﬁgures from World Development Indicators, oil has
constituted 10 to 15 per cent of GDP in both Ecuador and Norway between the late 1970s and 2000.
4to turn its recent diamond ﬁndings (during the 1980s) into a source of income.
When it comes to alluvial diamonds these are known to be very problematic in the
absence of good institutions. The civil wars in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo
and Sierra Leone are, for example, to a large extent fuelled and sustained by illegal
trade in diamonds.5 However, alluvial diamonds have not caused problems everywhere.
First discovered in 1867, South Africa has had large deposits of alluvial diamonds.6 The
economic eﬀects of these ﬁndings as compared to the discoveries in Sierra Leone in 1930
have arguably been very diﬀerent. But so have institutions. While both countries were
British colonies, the Cape Colony, which later expanded and eventually became South
Africa, obtained representative government with two elected houses as early as 1854.
Sierra Leone on the other hand, had the lowest colonial status in the British Empire, and
it was not until the 1950s that Sierra Leone started to have any form of representative
institutions. While the diamond ﬁndings in South Africa quickly drew investors and
became an industry with ﬁrm property rights, the same resource in Sierra Leone largely
remained up-for-grabs and has been a problem ever since it was found.7
In the following we will show that the economic impact of resource endowments sys-
tematically depends on the interaction between the types of resources and a country’s
institutions. In Section 2 we will relate our ideas to previous writings on the eﬀects of
resource abundance on economic development. In Section 3, we specify our hypothesis
and present our data. In particular, we report how we have constructed our measure for
the most appropriable resources. Section 4 tests our hypothesis using OLS regressions
5Campbell (2002) gives a full account of the devastating consequences of illicit diamonds in Sierra
Leone. Recently the UN as well as the World Diamond Council (WDC) have recognised these problems
and started projects to try to stop the illegal diamond trade.
6Even though South Africa has very large alluvial deposits, the main sources of diamond are kimber-
litic.
7This description of institutions in these countries is clearly very simplistic. In the early 20th century
the Cape colony lost some of its representative institutions and later came to limit franchise and political
rights only to the white population. Regarding Sierra Leone, it was not a colony for which Britain
had ever sought, but rather one they had to take on. Sierra Leone eventually obtained the status of
Protectorate in 1895, which meant minimal British administrative and political arrangements combined
with actions to prevent crime and lawlessness. For more details see the Oxford History of the British
Empire (2001).
5of GDP growth on diﬀerent measures of natural resources, institutions and their inter-
actions. We also address the issue of endogenous institutions and run 2SLS regressions
instrumenting for institutional quality. In Section 5 we check the robustness of our results
with respect to inﬂuential observations, sample size, the inﬂuence of armed conﬂicts and
the choice of institutional variables. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
There is strong evidence that resource abundant countries have had lower average growth
rates in the Post-war period as compared to their resource-poor counterparts. However,
there seems to be little agreement on why this relationship exists. The diﬀerent theories
that have been advanced can usefully be grouped into economic and political-economy
explanations.8
Most of the recent economic explanations are versions of the so called ”Dutch Dis-
ease”.9 The basic argument in these models is that windfall gains from natural resources
(either through sudden increases in the price of the resource, or through the discovery of
new resources) have a crowding-out eﬀect on other sectors of the economy. For example,
in Sachs and Warner (1995), following Matsuyama (1992), positive externalities in the
form of learning-by-doing are assumed to only be present in the manufacturing sector of
the economy. This implies that the larger is the natural resource sector (and the smaller
is the manufacturing sector), the smaller is the positive externality feeding the growth
process. However, these theories typically predict that the eﬀect of natural resources
on growth should unambiguously be negative: the more natural wealth, the worse the
outcome. As such, these theories cannot explain why Botswana and Norway have been
8One could, of course, add ”pure” political explanations, such as the ”rentier eﬀects” and (anti)
”modernization eﬀects” (see Ross (2001) for a discussion of these) as well as sociological studies of
negative eﬀects of resources on development (see Ross, 1999, footnote 2).
9For example, Corden and Neary (1982); Neary and van Wijnbergen (1986) and Krugman (1987).
For other economic theories based on, for example, declines in terms-of-trade and sensitivity to volatile
commodity prices, see the overview in Ross (1999).
6successful, while Sierra Leone and Ecuador have not.10
A number of papers have put forward more politico-economic explanations for why
natural resources have negative eﬀects on growth. Lane and Tornell (1999) and Torvik
(2002) have developed theoretical models of rent-seeking where resource abundance in-
creases the incentives to engage in ”non-productive” activities to capture the rents from
the resources. Even though these papers certainly give important insights, they also
predict a monotone adverse eﬀect of natural resources on economic growth. Collier and
Hoeﬄer (1998, 2002a) point to resources as a source of armed conﬂict. They ﬁnd a non-
linear relationship between natural resources and the risk of armed conﬂicts, but they still
do not explain why some resource rich countries prosper whereas others fail.11
Auty (1997); Woolcook et al. (2001) and Isham et al. (2003) have – as we do in this
paper – stressed the importance of diﬀerent types of resources. What they term ”point
source” resources, such as plantation crops and minerals, are more likely to cause problems
than ”diﬀuse” natural resources, such as rice, wheat and animals. These theories provide
predictions on why diﬀerent resource-rich countries may be aﬀected diﬀerently by their
natural wealth. Those with plantation crops, oil or diamonds are more likely to have
bad outcomes than those with rice, wheat, and livestock. This prediction seems to be
supported by data. However, these theories cannot account for the facts in Table 1. Why
is it that when comparing countries with similar natural resources, some seem to gain
from their endowments when others lose? The reason we suggest is that the relationship
between natural resources and growth is non-monotonic in institutional quality. Relating
to the theories of resources as a source of rent-seeking or conﬂict, the idea is that better
10In Gelb (1988) several studies ﬁnd that the mechanisms suggested by these models were not there in
the data. Resource booms have not shifted capital and labour away from manufacturing. Furthermore
governments seemed to be able to counter the ”disease” if necessary. As concluded by Neary and van
Wijnbergen (1986): ”In so far as one general conclusion can be drawn it is that a country’s economic
performance following a resource boom depends to a considerable extent on the policies followed by its
government...”.
11Given the insights on the importance of conﬂicts from Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998, 2002a) we control
for this and show that our results are not purely driven by resources causing conﬂict and thereby harming
growth.
7institutions increase the costs of non-productive activities.12 Merging these with theories
suggesting that types of resources matter, we also claim that the non-monotonicity will
depend on what resources the country is rich in. Speciﬁcally, our prediction is that
institutional quality is most crucial for countries rich in diamonds and precious metals.
Such countries, which have poor institutions, are expected to have the largest negative
eﬀects of resources, while similar countries with good institutions are predicted to have
large gains from these.
In emphasizing the interaction between types of resources and institutions we face the
crucial issue of potential endogeneity of institutions with respect to resources. As shown by
Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002), the diﬀerences in initial factor endowments between North
and South America have played an important role in shaping the diﬀerent institutions.
Put simply, their argument is that some countries enjoyed conditions favorable for growing
crops, such as sugar, which were most eﬃciently produced on large plantations. This led
to concentrations of wealth, political power, and human capital, and in the long run to
worse economic outcomes. In similar spirit, Acemoglu et al. (2002) argue that initial
conditions shaped the types of institutions set up in areas colonized by Europeans. They
suggest that ”extractive institutions” were set up where large gains could be made from
extractive policies and where settlement was diﬃcult due to the disease environment.
These areas were often densely-settled and initially relatively rich. ”Institutions of private
property”, on the other hand, were set up in places where Europeans settled in large
numbers, which were often poor and sparsely populated at the time of settlement. These
institutional diﬀerences later came to determine which areas could take advantage of the
opportunities to industrialize.13 Easterly and Levine (2002) and Rodrik et al. (2002) go
as far as to argue that once institutional quality is controlled for there is no separate
eﬀect from ”geographical factors”. While there is no doubt that geographical factors in
12This idea echoes Rodrik (1999), who stresses the role of institutions of conﬂict management.
13Acemoglu et al. (2001) speciﬁcally argue for the importance of settler mortality in shaping early
institutions which, through the persistence in institutional quality, has come to produce diﬀerent long-
run economic outcomes.
8general, and resource endowments in particular, have played an important role in shaping
institutions, this does not imply that all resources which are relevant today have been
part of this development. In some cases institutional diﬀerences precede the discovery of
resources and consequently determine the eﬀect of these discoveries on the economy. For
example, at the time of the oil discoveries in Norway and Ecuador, these countries had very
diﬀerent institutions, and we would argue that these diﬀerences determined the diverse
impacts of these discoveries on the economy. The same is true for many other countries
and resources. Nevertheless, there is a potential endogeneity problem and therefore, we
address the possibility of institutions being endogenous and show that our results hold
when instrumenting for institutional quality.
In closely related and independent work, Mehlum et al. (2002) and Robinson et al.
(2002) share our prediction of resources being non-monotonic in institutional quality.
Mehlum et al. (2002) develop a model where entrepreneurs choose between becoming ”pro-
ducers” or ”grabbers”. The relative payoﬀ from these activities depends on how ”grabber
friendly” the institutions are, which also determines the eﬀect of natural resources on the
economy. More natural resources raise the national income if institutions are ”produc-
tion friendly”, but reduce the national income if they are ”grabber friendly”. Robinson
et al. (2002) develop a model with similar predictions regarding the non-monotonic ef-
fect of resources depending on institutional quality, but where instead political incentives
generated by resources are key. In countries with good institutions resources are pos-
itive because the perverse political incentives are mitigated, but in countries with bad
institutions resources remain a curse.
Our study could be viewed as a test of these theories and we will indeed show that the
eﬀect of resources on economic performance depends on institutional quality. But we do
not test whether the channel is through the misallocation of talent between productive
activities and rent-seeking, through perverse political incentives, or through conﬂict over
resources. The reason is that we believe all these channels to be important and aﬀected
9by institutional quality in similar ways. Instead we add the dimension of resource type to
our analysis and show that how much institutions change the impact of resources crucially
depends on the type of resources a country has.
3 Our hypothesis and data
In contrast to the standard resource curse, our basic hypothesis is the following: Natural
resource abundance is negative for economic development only if the country lacks the
proper institutions for dealing with the potential conﬂicts and the rent-seeking behavior
in which the resources may otherwise result. A lack of proper institutions is likely to be
more serious for countries rich in physically and economically appropriable resources.
Figure 1: The two dimensions of resource appropriability. The number adjacent to each
country name is the share of primary exports in GDP in 1971. See the text for details.
Plotting countries with respect to the two dimensions of resource appropriability can
10serve as a simple illustration of our theory. Figure 1 shows a number of countries with
similar shares of primary exports in GDP (a common proxy for natural resources) graphed
with respect to type of resource and institutional quality.14 In the ﬁrst and fourth quad-
rant are countries with type of resources that are potentially problematic in that they are
more likely to cause appropriative behavior (than those in the second and third quad-
rant).15 Those on the left-hand side of the y-axis have lower than average measures of
institutional quality, while those on the right-hand side have better than average insti-
tutions.16 According to any theory which emphasizes the share of primary exports as
important for economic performance, the contribution from resources to economic growth
should, ceteris paribus, be roughly the same for all these countries.
Our prediction is that countries in the ﬁrst quadrant will beneﬁt from their natural
wealth, while those in the fourth quadrant will instead be ”cursed” by their endowments.
For countries in the second and third quadrant - countries with less appropriable types of
resources - the eﬀects of the interaction between natural resources and institutions are less
instrumental for economic development. This can be stated as two separate hypotheses.
The institutional dimension of appropriability: Natural resource abundance is neg-
14The countries included are all those in our data set with shares of primary export in GDP between
0.05 and 0.20. The average value for the respective quadrants is 0.11 for the ﬁrst, 0.14 for the second,
0.11 for the third and 0.13 for the fourth quadrant. This means that in terms of this proxy for natural
resource wealth the countries in the respective quadrants are, on average, very similar.
15Countries are classiﬁed according to their three leading primary exports in 1975. The lead export is
the main determinant of the country’s position in the graph and the second and third most important
primary product determine the ”direction” in which the country is placed. In Brazil and Thailand, for
example, sugar is the lead export product. But in Brazil the second and third export products are coﬀee
and iron ore, while in Thailand they are rice and maize, so Brazil is moved up toward minerals relative to
the heading ”coﬀee, cocoa, sugar and timber”, while Thailand is moved down toward agriculture products.
Some countries, such as Australia, are dominated by relatively equal shares of minerals and agricultural
products and are therefore positioned in between these labels. Exactly how these natural resources
should be ranked in terms of technical appropriability is, of course, debatable. In our analysis, we will
only distinguish between a broad measure of natural resources (which includes all primary products)
and narrower measures of more appropriable resources which only include ores and metals, and an even
narrower measure of what we deﬁne as the most appropriable resources, only including precious metals
and diamonds. See Auty (1997) and Woolcook et al. (2001) for a slightly diﬀerent distinction between
types of resources.
16Institutional quality is measured as an (unweighted) average of indexes for the quality of the bu-
reaucracy, corruption in government, rule of law, the risk of expropriation of private investment and
repudiation of contracts by the government. See Appendix Table A2 for details.
11ative for economic development only under poor institutions.
The technical dimension of appropriability: The impact of institutional quality and
abundant natural resources is more pronounced, the more technically appropriable are the
country’s natural resources.
The basic econometric speciﬁcation for testing the proposed eﬀects of resources and
institutions in country i becomes
growthi = X
0
iα + β1NRi + β2Insti + β3(NRi × Insti) + εi , (3.1)
where growth is the average yearly growth rate of GDP, X is a vector of controls including
initial GDP per capita level, period averages of openness and investment ratios, dummy
variables for Sub Saharan Africa and Latin America respectively and a constant. NR is
a measure of natural resource wealth (for which we will use our four measures discussed
below) and Inst is our measure of institutional quality. NR × Inst is the interaction
between natural resources and institutional quality.
According to our ﬁrst hypothesis β1 should be negative (the standard resource curse
ﬁnding), β2 should be positive (the standard ﬁnding that good institutional quality is
beneﬁcial for growth) and β3, the coeﬃcient for the interaction between natural resources
should be positive and - if it is to reverse the resource curse - have an absolute value larger
than β1.17 This would mean that as long as the institutional quality is good enough,
natural resources will have a positive net eﬀect on economic growth. Furthermore, our
second hypothesis implies that the impact on the growth rate of GDP of both the negative
eﬀect of the resources themselves (β1) and the interaction with institutional quality (β3)
should be stronger, the more appropriable are resources and the weaker are institutions.
Put diﬀerently, the institutional quality is more important for countries rich in technically
appropriable resources than for others.
17The fact that our measure of institutional quality has been rescaled to a 0-1 measure allows us to
directly compare the coeﬃcients.
12When addressing our second hypothesis, we are limited by the availability of data
for all natural resource measures for each country. This leaves us with a sample of 80
countries, both industrialized and developing (see Appendix Table A1 for a complete
listing). Our dependent variable, growth, is deﬁned as the average yearly growth rate of
GDP between 1975 and 1998.
We use four diﬀerent measures of natural resources to capture a gradual increase
in physical and economical appropriability. As the broadest measure we use the share
of primary exports to GNP from Sachs and Warner (1995), PrimExp (by them labelled
SXP). In terms of appropriability this measure includes everything from meat to precious
metals, that is the whole range of the y-axis in Figure 1. Second broadest is OrMetExp,
which includes the exports of ores and metals as a share of GDP – this corresponds to the
upper half of the y-axis. A similar measure in terms of appropriability is MinProd, the
share of mineral production in GNP.18 This diﬀers in two respects, however. It does not
include ores and it is a production – not an export – measure. If technically appropriable
resources are likely to be diverted on their way from production to export, this proxy is
expected to contain less measurement error.
Our fourth, and narrowest, measure MidasProd is the value of production of gold,
silver, and diamonds (industrial as well as gem stone) as a share of GDP – that is, the very
top of the y-axis in Figure 1. This measure is based on a combination of production and
price data. Production data are from the Minerals Yearbook, where production is reported
in volumes. For price data on silver and gold, we employ average yearly market prices
reported by the U.S. Geological Survey (1999). Such prices do not exist for diamonds
because of the large variation in quality. What we do have is the U.S. import quantities
and values of diamonds (industrial and gem stone) from diﬀerent countries. These are
used to obtain the per carat price for each country and quality, which we multiply with
production data. The total value of gold, silver and diamonds for each country is divided
18This measure is also taken from Sachs and Warner (1995), where it is called SNR.
13by GDP to obtain MidasProd.19
To reduce the risk of reverse causality we use initial year measures for all four resource
proxies.20 To capture institutional quality we employ the (unweighted) average of indexes
for the quality of the bureaucracy, corruption in government, rule of law, the risk of
expropriation of private investment, and repudiation of contracts by the government from
Keefer and Knack (2002). Our control variables are the level of GDP per capita in
1975, investment and trade openness.21 Sources and exact deﬁnitions of all variables are
presented in Appendix Table A2. Table 2 reports the correlations between these main
variables and enables us to address a number of issues. First, it indicates that the measures
of natural resources in themselves are not proxies for a country’s level of development.
In fact, the correlation between per capita GDP in 1975 and the diﬀerent measures of
natural resources is fairly low. Moreover, this potential problem seems to be largest for
the broadest measure of natural resources (PrimExp), while the narrower measures are
less correlated with the GDP level. Second, in Table 2, we ﬁnd institutions to be quite
modestly (negatively) correlated with the measures of natural resources. Third, Table 2
reports the initial GDP level and investments to be highly correlated with institutions.
This is addressed in the robustness section.
19The net value of alluvial diamonds is clearly higher (due to lower extraction costs) than that of
kimberlitic diamonds. However, we cannot distinguish between diﬀerent production costs for any natural
resource and therefore, we use the export value of the respective resources.
20The exception is MidasProd. Due to heavy price volatility during the years surrounding 1975, we
use the average of 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978 and 1980, to avoid the choice of a speciﬁc starting year to
inﬂuence our results. Our ﬁndings are similar when using MidasProd for 1974 or 1976, however.
21One control variable we have excluded is average years of schooling in the population, since it is
highly correlated with the other control variables. The regression results are robust to the inclusion of
schooling, however.
14Table 2: Correlation matrix for the entire sample
Growth Inst Prim OrMet Min Midas GDP75 Open
Institutions 0.39* 1
PrimExp -0.34* -0.29* 1
OrMetExp -0.14 -0.12 0.47* 1
MinProd -0.45* -0.33* 0.40* 0.42* 1
MidasProd -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 0.31* 0.30* 1
GDP75 0.19 0.83* -0.31* -0.17 -0.22 -0.14 1
Openness 0.23 0.17 0.30* 0.30* -0.01 0.03 0.08 1
Investments 0.55* 0.73* -0.31* -0.11 -0.31* -0.15 0.69* 0.30*
Figures in bold denote signiﬁcance at least at the 10 per cent level; * at the one per cent level.
4 Main results
To test our hypotheses, we ﬁrst run regressions using the broadest measure of natural
resources (PrimExp). Then, we use gradually narrower deﬁnitions of natural resources,
letting the measure of resources include fewer, but more physically and economically ap-
propriable resources. If more appropriable resources are better for economic development
when institutional quality is good, as well as increasingly problematic when institutions
are bad, this should appear in the regression outcomes. As the measure of natural re-
sources narrows down toward more technically appropriable resources, we expect the
(negative) eﬀect of resources (β1) as well as the (positive) eﬀect of the interaction term
(β3) to be more pronounced.
Columns (1)-(4) in Table 3 show our main results. In the ﬁrst column, we use the
broadest measure of natural resources (PrimExp). The signs of our three regressors
of interest are in line with our ﬁrst hypothesis, and while resources and the interaction
are not individually signiﬁcant, they are jointly signiﬁcant at the ﬁve-per cent level. The
interaction eﬀect is not suﬃciently large to outweigh the direct negative eﬀect of resources,
however. This equation is fairly similar to the one presented in a parallel paper by
Mehlum et al. (2002). However, they use diﬀerent data, a slightly diﬀerent speciﬁcation,
and consider the period 1965-1990 which can explain the diﬀerences in our results.22 All
22They use the same data set as Sachs and Warner (1997) which includes 87 countries. The data from
the Penn World Table are from Mark 5.6, while we use Mark 6.1, so revisions may be one explanation for
15control variables are signiﬁcant and have the expected signs.
Table 3: The main results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PrimExp OrMetExp MinProd MidasProd
Resources -6.392 -25.424*** -20.106*** -95.656***
(4.084) (8.596) (4.548) (27.804)
Institutions 6.763*** 4.893*** 4.614*** 5.564***
(1.963) (1.644) (1.362) (1.357)
ResInst 4.152 49.602*** 36.408*** 167.251***
(6.156) (18.609) (8.971) (38.508)
GDP75 -2.212*** -2.046*** -1.955*** -2.019***
(0.377) (0.326) (0.309) (0.288)
Openness 0.504* 0.218 0.277 0.142
(0.274) (0.298) (0.246) (0.245)
Investments 0.087*** 0.092*** 0.103*** 0.089***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
Observations 80 80 80 80
R2 0.63 0.65 0.67 0.70
Joint(p) 0.044 0.009 0.000 0.000
Notes: Dependent variable is growth. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. All regres-
sions include a constant term and regional dummies for Latin America and
Sub Saharan Africa (not shown). Joint(p) denotes whether the coeﬃcient esti-
mates of resources, and the interaction of resources and institutions are jointly
signiﬁcant.
We then narrow down the measure towards more physically and economically appro-
priable resources, reported in columns (2)-(4) in Table 3. Now, natural resources, institu-
tions, and their interaction are all signiﬁcant at the one per cent level (and resources and
the interaction are jointly signiﬁcant). The interaction eﬀect outweighs the impact of the
resources and hence, resources tend to be positive for growth for good enough quality of
institutions.
This supports our hypothesis that more appropriable resources are indeed more prob-
lematic, unless a country has suﬃciently good institutions. Since the size of the natural
resource variables diﬀers greatly, a direct comparison of the coeﬃcient estimates is not very
informative. We evaluate the impact of diﬀerent resources by calculating the marginal
eﬀects of a standard deviation change at diﬀerent levels of institutional quality, using the
the diﬀerence in our results. They also use another variable for openness. In particular, they do not use
any regional dummies, which we believe make the largest diﬀerence. When excluding regional dummies
from our regression presented in column (1), Table 3, we obtained results very similar to theirs.
16coeﬃcients from Table 3, columns (1)-(4). Formally,
∆growth = (b β1 + b β3 g Inst) × sdNR ,
where g Inst is the level of institutional quality, and sdNR is a standard deviation change
in the resource measures.23 For each of the four resource measures, we evaluate the growth
impact for four diﬀerent levels of institutional quality, the minimum level in the sample,
0.232 (the value for Democratic Republic of Congo), the average, 0.634 (between the
value for Trinidad and Tobago and Costa Rica), the average level of institutions plus one
standard deviation, 0.854 (between Hong Kong and Singapore), and the maximum, 0.995
(Switzerland). Table 4 reports the calculated eﬀects. It illustrates both our hypotheses.
First, reading the table top-down, given the production of natural resources, institutional
quality is conducive to growth (the institutional dimension of appropriability). Second,
reading left-right, the importance of good institutions increases in the physical and eco-
nomic appropriablility of resources (the technical dimension of appropriability).
Table 4: Marginal eﬀects of resources on growth (for diﬀerent levels of
institutional quality)
PrimExp OrMetExp MinProd MidasProd
Worst institutions -0.548 -0.946 -1.127 -1.425
Average institutions -0.378 0.425 0.304 0.279
Aver. + 1 st.dev. institutions -0.288 1.152 1.062 1.183
Best institutions -0.228 1.629 1.560 1.776
Given the recent insights provided by Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) and Rodrik et al.
(2002) regarding the importance of the quality of institutions for economic development,
further investigating the role of institutions in our regression (3.1) is crucial. There are
basically two concerns. The ﬁrst is that natural resources would determine institutions,
which in turn would drive economic development - as hypothesized by Engerman and
23For example, using MinProd and the mean level of institutions (0.634) gives: (−20.1+36.4∗0.638)∗
0.097 = 0.304. The interpretation is that, ceteris paribus, a country with an average level of institutional
quality would increase its annual growth rate by 0.3 per cent if it were to increase its mineral production
by one standard deviation.
17Sokoloﬀ (2002) and Isham et al. (2003), for example. This would mean that our empirical
































































































Figure 2: Plot of MinProd against institutions
Besides Table 2 showing that the correlation between our diﬀerent measures of natural
resources with institutions is low, Figure 2 plots institutions against MinProd. Bearing
in mind that MinProd is the most correlated measure of natural resources, it is not clear
that natural resources determine institutional quality in our sample.
The second concern arises from the fact that institutions could be correlated with the
error term in our regression equation (3.1), so that our speciﬁcation would suﬀer from
endogeneity. To address this concern we perform a regression based Hausman test for
endogeneity, which fails to reject the null hypothesis that institutions and the interaction
term of institutions and natural resources are exogenous, as reported in Table 3.24 For
one measure however, OrMetExp, the hypothesis is rejected at the ﬁve-per cent level.
Nevertheless, we choose to instrument institutions (and the interaction) with latitude
24In our structural model growth = X0
iα + β1NRi + β2Insti + β3(NRi × Insti) + εi, we suspect
Inst and hence NR × Inst to be endogenous. We run the ﬁrst-stage reduced form regressions Insti =
X0
iα+β1NRi +Z0
iγ +v1 and NRi ×Insti = X0
iα+β1NRi +Z0
iη+v2 where Z0 is our set of instruments.
Then, we include the Least Squares residuals b v1 and b v2 in the structural equation. In one speciﬁcation
out of four (using OrMetExp) we reject exogeneity of Inst and NR × Inst, i.e. the joint F-test for the
OLS-residuals is signiﬁcant.
18and EurFrac, the fraction speaking any European language (and latitude and EurFrac
interacted with resources) by using 2SLS. This set of instruments derives from Hall and
Jones (1999) and are also used in Alcal´ a and Ciccone (2004).
In Table 5, columns (1)-(4), we present the results from these estimations. The ﬁrst
stage regressions are reported in Appendix Table B1. In terms of instrument relevance, the
excluded instruments enter jointly signiﬁcant in every ﬁrst-stage regression. Importantly,
in no speciﬁcation is a single ”good” instrument alone responsible for the signiﬁcance in
both ﬁrst-stage regressions (in which case the model would be unidentiﬁed). The Hansen
J-test of exogeneity of excluded instruments, presented in Table 5, suggests instruments to
be valid.25 In all four regressions, the coeﬃcient for institutions is larger as compared to
those obtained under OLS, which is consistent with attenuation bias due to measurement
error in the OLS-estimates. However, the 2SLS coeﬃcients are less precisely measured,
so institutions loses in signiﬁcance. Turning to our resource measures, in column (1),
the coeﬃcient of PrimExp falls by around thirty per cent, and the interaction is now
virtually zero. In column (2), our second export-based measure, OrMetExp, retains its
expected properties, though both coeﬃcients are around half the OLS-estimates and no
longer signiﬁcant. For the (production-based) measures of highly technically appropriable
resources in columns (3)-(4), the outcomes are similar to those obtained under OLS, both
regarding coeﬃcient values and statistical signiﬁcance.
25In addition, we included latitude directly in the OLS-speciﬁcation. While it entered with a positive
coeﬃcient in all regressions, it was never near any conventional level of signiﬁcance.
19Table 5: Results when instrumenting for institutions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PrimExp OrMetExp MinProd MidasProd
Resources -4.443 -12.461 -16.998*** -89.995***
(4.771) (9.859) (6.259) (28.203)
Institutions 7.592** 6.839* 6.021 6.554*
(3.463) (3.788) (4.019) (3.452)
ResInst 0.664 23.586 30.646** 158.769***
(7.112) (20.405) (12.699) (39.762)
GDP75 -2.294*** -2.250*** -2.161*** -2.184***
(0.646) (0.649) (0.762) (0.626)
Openness 0.508* 0.229 0.261 0.138
(0.271) (0.293) (0.261) (0.254)
Investments 0.082*** 0.090*** 0.096*** 0.084***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Observations 80 80 80 80
R2 0.62 0.63 0.66 0.70
Joint(p) 0.026 0.431 0.028 0.000
Ovid 0.207 0.311 0.134 0.511
Hausman 0.697 0.030 0.787 0.797
First-stage results in Appendix Table B1
Notes: Dependent variable is growth. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. All regressions
include a constant term and regional dummies for Latin America and Sub Sa-
haran Africa (not shown). Joint(p) denotes whether the coeﬃcient estimates
of resources, and the interaction of resources and institutions are jointly signif-
icant. Ovid reports the p-values from the Hansen J-overidentiﬁcation test for
instruments. Hausman reports p-values of the regression-based Hausman test
for endogeneity as explained in the text. The null hypothesis is that institutions
are exogenous.
We also tried to use settler mortality – as suggested in Acemoglu et al. (2001) –
as an instrument for institutions. This means, on the one hand, that we potentially
obtain more precise estimates (given that the usual assumptions hold). On the other
hand, we now have a much smaller sample. Data on settler mortality only exist for 50
countries in our data set. OLS estimates in this smaller sample are similar to our main
results. The results from instrumentation are presented in Appendix Tables B2 (ﬁrst-
stage results), and B3 (IV-estimates). In this smaller sample, our excluded instruments
lose their relevance. However, for the speciﬁcations where instruments pass the F-test
(OrMetExp and MidasProd), the original results go through. On balance, except for
our broadest measure, PrimExp, our conclusion is that the 2SLS estimates do not diﬀer
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Figure 3: The partial eﬀect of institutions on growth when dividing the sample in groups
of below-the-average and above-the-average natural resources.
Figure 3 shows the partial eﬀects of the combination of institutions and natural re-
sources on economic growth. (Here, we use MinProd as a measure of natural resources,
while analogous ﬁgures for the other measures of natural resources are presented in Ap-
pendix B1.) The sample is divided into two groups depending on whether the country has
a natural resource level above the mean. Countries with less than the mean production of
minerals (MinProd) are represented by ’circles’, while countries with a higher than mean
production of natural resources have a ’plus’. We ﬁt two regression lines (one for each
group) by using the regression coeﬃcients in column (3) of Table 3, and the respective
group averages.26
As hypothesized, countries with less natural resources score better than those with
plenty of natural resources when institutions are poor. However, for suﬃciently good
institutions, the eﬀect is reversed. From the coeﬃcients in Table 3, we calculate this
institutional threshold level to be 0.55.27 Above this cutoﬀ level, the partial contribution
of resources is higher for a high MinProd country than for low MinProd country, while
26Using MinProd for country i, in our structural model growthi = b β1MinProdj + b β2Insti +
b β3(MinProdj × Insti), where MinProdj is the group mean of group j with j ∈ {low;high}. The
mean of MinProd is 0.058, while the average value for those countries with MinProd less than the mean
is 0.013 and the average for those countries with more than the mean is 0.182.
27That is, instcutoff = −b β1/b β3.
21the opposite holds below the institutional cutoﬀ. In other words, countries with more
resources need relatively better institutions to have the same growth eﬀect as countries
with fewer resources. Moreover, giving further support to our technical appropriability
hypothesis, the institutional threshold level increases somewhat in the technical appropri-
ability of the resource. More speciﬁcally, for OrMetExp the institutional cutoﬀ is 0.51,
for MinProd 0.55, and for MidasProd 0.57.
5 Robustness of the results
This section aims at checking the robustness of our results. In the previous section, we
had a wide sample of countries, including both industrialized and developing countries.
We now restrict the sample in various ways. First, we focus on developing countries only,
and ﬁnd that the results do not depend on the inclusion of rich countries. Furthermore, we
show that dropping potential outliers does not remove our results. Another part of this
section addresses the concern that our results would be driven by a speciﬁc continent.
Africa is often mentioned as the continent with the resource curse problem, so that it
might be suspected that excluding Africa would alter our results. While the results turn
out to be somewhat less pronounced, they are still present, however. Excluding Latin
America has a minor eﬀect on the main results.
The subsequent section tackles how measures of conﬂict aﬀect our main results. The
reason is simply that countries at war ceteris paribus have a lower economic output and
if natural resources fuel conﬂicts, the importance of the appropriability eﬀect in our main
results may be driven by the existence of conﬂicts in these countries. This eﬀect turns
out to be without importance for our results, however. Finally we investigate whether the
institutional measure used inﬂuences the outcome. Although our main results are qualita-
tively robust to diﬀerent institutional measures, these regressions reveal some interesting
quantitative eﬀects. In addition, Table 2 reported a high correlation between institutions
and initial GDP level and investments. To check to what extent these correlations inﬂu-
22ence our conclusions, we used a more parsimonious empirical speciﬁcation dropping and
adding control variables. These results are presented in Appendix Table B4 for the use
of MidasProd.28
5.1 Excluding the developed countries
Although it is reassuring that our hypothesis has empirical support in a large sample
of countries, much of the resource curse debate has concerned the lack of development
in resource-intensive developing countries in the last decades. Do our hypotheses hold
when restricting the sample to only contain developing countries? This would seem quite
challenging for our results since, by dropping rich countries, we exclude many countries
with high institutional quality, some of which are rich in natural resources and which may
be driving the ”positive” side of the interaction eﬀect. Columns (1)-(4) in Table 6 report
the results when excluding all the countries that where members of the OECD in 1975.29
We ﬁnd support for a non-monotonic relation between natural resources and growth,
even when considering the developing countries separately. Good institutions are still
crucial when having plenty of highly technically appropriable resources. If anything,
institutional quality in itself appears to be somewhat more important for growth in devel-
oping countries. (For example, comparing the coeﬃcients in column (4) in Table 6 with
the corresponding column in Table 3, gives at hand that the coeﬃcient for institutions
is slightly larger in the sample with only developing countries, while the resources and
the interaction term coeﬃcients are slightly smaller.)
28One speciﬁcation also includes schooling (see footnote 21). The use of other measures of natural
resources yields the same changes. Moreover, following Sachs and Warner (2001), to address the issue of
reverse causality we have included growth of GDP per capita in the previous period (in our case 1960-
1974). Including lagged GDP growth does not alter our main results in any signiﬁcant respect. These
results are available from the authors upon request.
29The excluded countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and USA.
235.2 Are Botswana and Sierra Leone driving the results?
Naturally, there are countries in our sample diﬀering considerably from all the rest. Just
when eye-balling the data there are certain countries that are outliers either with respect to
their growth performance over the period or their initial endowment of natural resources.
Considering Figures 4(a) and 4(b), obvious outliers in these respects for the MidasProd













































































































MidasProd, no zeroes, no extremes
















































Figure 4: MidasProd and institutions
To check for inﬂuential observations, i.e. observations with either a high leverage or
a large residual, we use the DFITS index when estimating equation (3.1). Observations
with a DFITS index larger than the absolute value of 2
p
k/n (where k is the number
of independent variables, including the constant, and n the number of observations),
are excluded from the sample.31 Thereby, we obtain a speciﬁc sample for each measure
of natural resource endowment. Columns (5)-(8) in Table 6 report the results and the
countries excluded from the sample with each measure of natural resources. The outcome
varies to a surprisingly small extent when excluding outliers. The qualitative results are
in general the same, but the coeﬃcients for natural resources measured as MidasProd
30As seen from Figure 4(a), MidasProd may be problematic in two ways. It has some clear outliers
and many countries in the sample simply do not have any production of diamonds or precious metals.
Besides our exclusion of inﬂuential observations using DFITS, we also ran regressions on MidasProd
while excluding extreme observations. Excluding countries with zero production has little eﬀect. When
also dropping all observations with at least as high a MidasProd as that of the Dominican Republic
(leaving us with a sample of 43 countries), the interaction term turns insigniﬁcant (p-value 0.14), though
the three variables of interest are still jointly signiﬁcant at the 99 per cent level. These estimates are
available from the authors upon request.
31DFITSi = ri
p
hi/(1 − hi), where ri are the studentised residuals and hi the leverage.
24turn individually insigniﬁcant. However, they are still highly jointly signiﬁcant, so the
appropriability eﬀect is in line with the basic results.
5.3 Is Africa (or Latin America) responsible for our results?
While the previous section showed that the hypothesis in this paper provides a good
explanation for the developing countries as a group, it might be that the results are
entirely driven by particular regions. Africa is known as a continent with abundant
resources, in particular precious metals, but also for its wars and low income per capita
levels. It is thus a concern that our main results (presented in Table 3) could be driven
by the development of the African continent. In Table 7, columns (1)-(4), we re-estimate
equation (3.1), but drop Africa from the sample. The results clearly indicate that in the
presence of highly appropriable resources (especially MidasProd), good institutions are
quintessential for economic development also when excluding Africa.
Columns (5)-(8) in Table 7 show the same to be true when excluding Latin America.
This is particularly reassuring since recent studies have pointed at the importance of
initial factor endowments and other geographical factors for the shaping of institutions in
Latin America. For example, Sokoloﬀ and Engerman (2000) argue that the casual relation
runs from the initial resource endowment fostering a certain institutional setting, which
can or cannot be beneﬁcial for long-run economic development. Sugar, coﬀee and cocoa
economies in Latin America are often used to illustrate the point, but also mineral rich
economies such as Chile and Peru. The idea is that the production of these resources
is both valuable and easy to control for a small elite. This elite has all the incentives
to ensure that the ownership of land remains concentrated in its hands, which is most
easily achieved by impeding the spread of education and democratic institutions. Thereby,
initial resource endowment is suggested to generate a strong path dependence aﬀecting
the pattern of economic development. That is, in the setting of this paper, it could be
suspected that natural resources have determined the institutional formation in these
25countries. Columns (5)-(8) in Table 7 indicate that our main results are not driven by
the presence of Latin American countries.
5.4 Importance of civil wars
A potentially important mechanism, already mentioned in the Introduction, through
which natural resources could aﬀect economic development is by creating conﬂicts. Allu-
vial diamonds are maybe the resource most known for generating conﬂicts, but also oil (as
in Sudan) can apparently fuel conﬂicts. We test whether conﬂicts aﬀect the importance
of appropriability for economic development by including two diﬀerent measures. The
ﬁrst measure, conflict, is a dummy for the occurrence of any kind of conﬂict during the
period. The country in question can thus be involved in a international or internal war, or
be having a conﬂict with a neighbouring country. Civil war instead assumes the value of
one if there were a civil war with at least a thousand battle-related deaths in the period.
Neither the inclusion of conflict nor of civil war has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the results, as
reported in Table 8; if anything, the appropriability eﬀect of resources becomes slightly
more important. Now, this does not show anything but that our main results are not
driven by conﬂicts.
5.5 Robustness to other institutional measures
The last robustness check consists of using alternative measures of institutional quality.
Even though institutional measures in general tend to be highly correlated, we test if
our basic equation (3.1) holds with a variety of institutional measures. More speciﬁcally,
we use seven measures ranging from Polity75 from the Polity IV data set (Marshall and
Jaggers, 2002) to Rule of Law in 1998 (RLaw98) from Kaufmann et al. (2002). To reduce
the number of tables, we only report the outcomes when using MidasProd as the measure
of initial natural resource endowment. In addition, to increase the comparability of the
estimates, we have rescaled the institutional indexes so as all of them range between 0
26and 1.
Table 9 reports the regression results. The interaction eﬀect of MidasProd and
institutions is always positive, as expected, and signiﬁcant. This means that our results
do not appear to be sensitive to the chosen measure of institutional quality. However,
the magnitude of the appropriability eﬀect is approximately ﬁve times larger when using
Repud84 instead of Polity75, given the same level of natural resources (Institutions has
a quantitatively intermediate appropriability eﬀect). These results are suggestive of the
mechanisms driving the appropriability of a resource. Copper, oil, kimberlitic diamonds
and other investment intensive and very valuable resources are extremely sensitive to
the investment climate in the host country. Nothing can hurt investments as much as a
regime repudiating contracts, since this radically increases the riskiness of heavy invest-
ments. The extent of democratic rule, as captured by Polity75, on the other hand seems
less important for investment decisions as long as the companies are on friendly terms
with the regime.
6 Summary and concluding remarks
Kenneth Kaunda, the former President of Zambia, has been quoted to say ”We are in part
to blame, but this is the curse of being born with a copper spoon in our mouths”, referring
to Zambia’s poor economic performance.32 In another quote referring to the deterministic,
negative eﬀects of having abundant resources, Leonardo Sim˜ ao (Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs
of Mozambique) has said, ”Mozambique is diﬀerent [from Angola]. We are fortunate not
to have oil and not to have diamonds”.33 This paper suggests that such statements need
some modiﬁcation. The problem for Zambia, and many other countries, does not lie in the
resource richness per se, but in the combination of having poor institutions and resource
wealth. Our results indicate that a suﬃcient improvement in institutional quality turns
32Ross (1999).
33Speech delivered at the Swedish Institute of International Aﬀairs, Stockholm, Sweden on June 18,
1999.
27resource abundance into an asset rather than a curse.
Furthermore, we have shown the type of natural resources a country possesses to be
of crucial importance. The negative eﬀects of poor institutional quality are much more
severe in countries rich in potentially problematic types of resources, as compared to
those rich in other natural resources. Conversely, the rewards for good institutions are
greatest for the countries with more appropriable types of resources. For all our measures
of mineral-intensity, the positive interaction term outweighs the negative eﬀect of the
resources themselves, and this eﬀect is highly signiﬁcant. We ﬁnd the strongest and most
signiﬁcant eﬀects when using the value of production of precious metals and diamonds.
What are the quantitative implications of our ﬁndings? Taking the point estimates
seriously, our results suggest that if a country, such as Sierra Leone (with an average
growth rate of -2.05 per cent since 1975) were to manage to close the gap in institutional
quality with a country like Botswana (with a growth rate of 4.99 per cent over the period),
then its yearly growth rate would also approach that of Botswana. Thus, Sierra Leone has
the potential of performing like Botswana, but it lacks the necessary institutional setting.
This paper challenges the traditional resource curse which, taken literally, would sim-
ply suggest that a country would be better oﬀ without its resources. We ﬁnd this hard to
believe. Identifying a non-montone relationship between institutions and resources, and
the particular role of certain types of minerals, we show that it is possible to reverse the
curse. The literal policy advice of this paper would thus be to ”Get your institutions
right, especially if you have plenty of diamonds and precious metals”. Naturally, this is
not very informative in terms of implementation, but it does suggest that countries can
do something more to improve their economic situation than giving away their resources
– as suggested by the resource curse hypothesis.
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Table 6: Results for developing countries, and when excluding outliers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PrimExp OrMetExp MinProd MidasProd PrimExp OrMetExp MinProd MidasProd
Resources -3.613 -35.257*** -18.034*** -87.623*** -8.110** -20.416** -22.293*** -89.245
(7.049) (7.416) (6.057) (28.932) (3.069) (7.859) (3.679) (74.173)
Institutions 9.579*** 5.502** 5.932*** 6.832*** 4.317*** 3.656*** 3.327*** 5.142***
(3.232) (2.264) (2.178) (2.063) (1.314) (1.370) (1.250) (1.347)
ResInst -0.430 71.792*** 32.108** 153.329*** 7.227 36.804** 39.733*** 159.326
(12.691) (14.261) (13.160) (41.081) (4.969) (17.732) (7.610) (98.810)
GDP75 -2.038*** -1.872*** -1.855*** -1.938*** -1.795*** -1.650*** -1.633*** -1.856***
(0.408) (0.348) (0.415) (0.350) (0.244) (0.248) (0.249) (0.276)
Openness 0.451 0.261 0.231 0.115 0.543** 0.267 0.370* 0.253
(0.357) (0.357) (0.302) (0.299) (0.219) (0.232) (0.215) (0.218)
Investments 0.058 0.077** 0.093** 0.080** 0.084*** 0.080*** 0.093*** 0.085***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.040) (0.036) (0.020) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023)
Observations 58 58 58 58 73 74 74 75
R2 0.65 0.71 0.68 0.72 0.74 0.71 0.71 0.68
Joint(p) 0.129 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
Notes: Dependent variable is growth. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
All regressions include a constant term and regional dummies for Latin America and Sub Saharan Africa (not shown). Joint(p) denotes whether
the coeﬃcient estimates of resources, and the interaction of resources and institutions are jointly signiﬁcant. Excluded countries in (1) are:
Botswana, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Guyana, Haiti, Nicaragua, and South Africa; in (2): Belgium, Botswana, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Hong Kong,
Haiti, and Nicaragua; in (3): Botswana, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Haiti, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, and Venezuela; and in (4): Botswana, Dem. Rep.
of Congo, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Sierra Leone.
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2Table 7: Results when excluding Sub Saharan Africa or Latin America.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PrimExp OrMetExp MinProd MidasProd PrimExp OrMetExp MinProd MidasProd
Resources -6.551 -6.906 -14.186** -403.961** -6.325 -27.107** -21.568*** -87.306***
(5.064) (6.760) (6.563) (177.626) (4.926) (10.803) (4.023) (29.269)
Institutions 5.366*** 5.587*** 5.082*** 5.540*** 7.241*** 5.368*** 4.833*** 5.608***
(1.550) (1.501) (1.481) (1.361) (2.313) (1.879) (1.399) (1.351)
ResInst 4.427 12.562 23.048** 629.596* 4.794 49.217** 41.682*** 154.989***
(6.709) (14.857) (11.280) (354.121) (6.946) (24.097) (7.486) (40.608)
GDP75 -2.067*** -2.079*** -2.034*** -2.101*** -2.286*** -2.098*** -1.975*** -2.008***
(0.317) (0.324) (0.341) (0.324) (0.437) (0.364) (0.283) (0.258)
Openness 0.515* 0.236 0.303 0.301 0.598** 0.419 0.473* 0.366
(0.259) (0.311) (0.266) (0.254) (0.285) (0.332) (0.269) (0.273)
Investments 0.084*** 0.090*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 0.095*** 0.107*** 0.090***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024)
Observations 64 64 64 64 58 58 58 58
R2 0.60 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.71 0.74 0.78 0.81
Joint(p) 0.102 0.587 0.106 0.068 0.160 0.001 0.000 0.000
Notes: Dependent variable is growth. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at
1%. All regressions include a constant term and regional dummies for Latin America and Sub Saharan Africa (not shown). Joint(p) denotes
whether the coeﬃcient estimates of resources, and the interaction of resources and institutions, are jointly signiﬁcant.
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3Table 8: Results when including measures of conﬂicts.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PrimExp OrMetExp MinProd MidasProd PrimExp OrMetExp MinProd MidasProd
Resources -6.919 -26.720*** -21.856*** -95.803*** -6.316 -27.982*** -19.363*** -89.229***
(4.624) (8.416) (5.072) (28.239) (4.108) (8.707) (4.808) (30.521)
Institutions 6.390*** 4.388** 3.736** 5.520*** 5.847*** 3.374** 4.115*** 4.952***
(2.191) (1.806) (1.518) (1.489) (2.045) (1.589) (1.406) (1.428)
ResInst 5.001 51.067*** 39.765*** 167.403*** 4.201 52.958*** 35.102*** 158.615***
(6.807) (18.011) (9.641) (38.984) (6.141) (19.045) (9.143) (41.933)
GDP75 -2.167*** -1.975*** -1.837*** -2.013*** -2.124*** -1.903*** -1.909*** -1.968***
(0.389) (0.344) (0.311) (0.304) (0.360) (0.289) (0.290) (0.270)
Openness 0.483* 0.203 0.222 0.138 0.426 0.150 0.228 0.092
(0.267) (0.293) (0.242) (0.246) (0.291) (0.308) (0.272) (0.265)
Investments 0.085*** 0.088*** 0.098*** 0.088*** 0.086*** 0.090*** 0.102*** 0.088***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Conflict -0.166 -0.267 -0.434 -0.028
(0.402) (0.385) (0.395) (0.359)
Civil War -0.569 -0.826 -0.380 -0.443
(0.501) (0.506) (0.511) (0.531)
Observations 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
R2 0.63 0.65 0.67 0.70 0.64 0.67 0.67 0.71
Joint(p) 0.053 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.002 0.001 0.000
Notes: Dependent variable is growth. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
All regressions include a constant term and regional dummies for Latin America and Sub Saharan Africa (not shown). Joint(p) denotes whether
the coeﬃcient estimates of resources, and the interaction of resources and institutions, are jointly signiﬁcant.
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4Table 9: Results when using alternative institutional measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Polity75 PropRight84 RLaw84 Exprop84 Repud84 KKZ98
MidasProd -53.676* -102.199*** -69.226 -154.248*** -154.841*** -58.965***
(27.213) (32.204) (48.935) (32.485) (57.234) (17.719)
AltInst 0.512 4.274*** 2.121* 3.648*** 4.279*** 3.550***
(0.564) (1.191) (1.082) (1.021) (1.096) (1.076)
ResInst 81.498*** 184.947*** 108.694* 253.365*** 292.938*** 128.846***
(29.339) (48.624) (58.775) (45.963) (95.151) (27.085)
GDP75 -1.140*** -1.960*** -1.426*** -1.543*** -1.800*** -1.497***
(0.238) (0.304) (0.356) (0.222) (0.252) (0.264)
Openness 0.019 0.142 0.192 0.129 0.049 -0.016
(0.231) (0.248) (0.229) (0.240) (0.268) (0.234)
Investments 0.118*** 0.092*** 0.095*** 0.086*** 0.111*** 0.098***
(0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 78 76 76 76 76 80
R2 0.63 0.69 0.62 0.69 0.68 0.69
Joint(p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Dependent variable is growth. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant
at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. All regressions include a constant term and regional dummies for Latin America
and Sub Saharan Africa (not shown). Joint(p) denotes whether the coeﬃcient estimates of resources, and the
interaction of resources and institutions are jointly signiﬁcant.
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* These countries are, due to data availability, measured until 1996.
36Table A2: Deﬁnitions and sources of variables
PrimExp Share of exports of primary products in GNP in 1971. Source: Sachs
and Warner (1995), where it is labelled SXP.
OrMetExp Value of export of ores and metals as a share of GDP in 1975. Source:
UNCTAD (1975, 1979)
MinProd Share of mineral production (does not include fuels) in GNP in 1971,
where ”mineral production” is the production value of the 23 highest
valued minerals in the world as of 1973. Source: Sachs and Warner
(1995) where it is labelled SNR.
MidasProd Value of the production of gold, silver, platinum group metals and di-
amonds as a share of GDP, average 1972 to 1980. Source: Own cal-
culations from Minerals Yearbook (various years), and U.S. Geological
Survey (1999).
Institutions Derived from the IRIS data originally constructed by Knack and Keefer
(1995) based on data from the International Country Risk Guide. The
ﬁve Property Right Index components are Quality of the bureaucracy,
Corruption in government, and Rule of law, scoring from 0-6, and Risk
of expropriation of private investment, and Repudiation of contracts
by government, scored 0-10. Higher scores mean better quality, lower
corruption and lower risks. By transforming the ﬁrst three into ten
point scales (as do Keefer and Knack, 2002), the (unweighted) sum gives
an index from 0 to 50 which we rescale into an index between zero and
one. Source: Keefer and Knack (2002)).
Growth Average yearly growth rate (in per cent) between 1975 and 1998. Calcu-
lated as ln(rgdpch98)-ln(rgdpch75)* 100/20, where rgdpch is the PPP-
adjusted GDP per capita between 1975 and 1998. Source: Penn World
Table, Mark 6.1.
GDP75 Real GDP per capita in constant dollars (Chain index) expressed in
international prices ln(rgdpch75). Source: Penn World Table, Mark 6.1
Schooling Average schooling years in the total population 1975. Source: Barro and
Lee (2000).
Openness Natural logarithm of average openness (openc) 1975 to 1998. Source:
Penn World Table, Mark 6.1.
Investments Average investment share of real GDP per capita (ki) 1975 to 1998.
Source: Penn World Table, Mark 6.1.
Latitude The absolute value of the latitude of the country, scaled to take values
between 0 and 1. Source: La Porta et al. (1998).
Conﬂict Dummy for occurrence of conﬂict during period. It refers to any type of
conﬂict with at least 25 battle-related deaths per year during the conﬂict.
Source: Strand et al. (2002).
Civil war Dummy for any civil war started during the period leading to at least
1000 battle-related deaths. Source: Collier and Hoeﬄer (2002b).
37Table A3: Summary statistics, entire sample
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
Growth 1.533 1.965 -5.391 5.968
PrimExp 0.121 0.101 0.006 0.543
OrMetExp 0.041 0.068 0 0.357
MinProd 0.058 0.097 0 0.509
MidasProd 0.006 0.025 0 0.198
Institutions 0.638 0.215 0.232 0.995
GDP75 8.332 0.98 6.389 9.923
Openness 4.045 0.55 2.79 5.899
Investments 16.875 7.701 2.38 44.231
N 80
Table A4: Summary statistics, developing countries
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
Growth 1.341 2.241 -5.391 5.968
PrimExp 0.137 0.107 0.01 0.543
OrMetExp 0.046 0.078 0 0.357
MinProd 0.074 0.109 0 0.509
MidasProd 0.008 0.029 0 0.198
Institutions 0.53 0.135 0.232 0.872
GDP75 7.881 0.749 6.389 9.306
Openness 4.054 0.584 2.79 5.899
Investments 14.478 7.538 2.38 44.231
N 58
Table A5: Summary statistics, other institutional measures
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. N
polity75 0.532 0.399 0 1 78
propright84 0.574 0.25 0.189 0.992 76
rule84 0.539 0.298 0.167 1 76
expropriati84 0.614 0.215 0.18 0.98 76
repudate84 0.601 0.209 0.16 0.98 76
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Figure B1: Partial eﬀects of natural resources and institutions on growth, respectively.
These ﬁgures are constructed using coeﬃcient estimates from Table 3, columns (3)-(4),
and the (not reported) estimates from the regression with MidasProd without extreme
observations. (To economise on space we have not reported the corresponding ﬁgures
using OrMetProd, but they look very similar to MinProd.) The left-hand panel of
Figure B1 presents the partial eﬀect of natural resources on growth given the quality of
institutions. The right-hand part gives the ﬂip side - the eﬀect of institutions on growth
given the production of natural resources. These are constructed analogously as described
in footnote 26.
The interpretation of all ﬁgures to the left is that, regardless of the type of natural
resource, more of the resources are beneﬁcial (detrimental) for growth given that the coun-
try has suﬃciently good (poor) quality of its institutions. The right-hand part illustrates
that improvements in institutional quality are always worthwhile. However, countries
39with more resources need better institutions to have the same growth eﬀect as countries
with fewer resources.
Above the institutional threshold level, the partial contribution to growth of resources
is higher for a country with plenty of resources than for a country with few resources.
Below the institutional cutoﬀ, the eﬀect is reversed. Furthermore, considering our techni-
cally appropriability hypothesis, the institutional threshold level increases in the technical
appropriability of the resource. More speciﬁcally, for OrMetProd the institutional cutoﬀ
is 0.51, for MinProd 0.55, for MidasProd 0.57, and for MidasProd excluding extremes,
it is 0.82.
40Table B1: First-stage regressions when instrumenting institutions with latitude and fraction speaking any European
language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PrimExp PrimExpX OrMetExp OrMetExpX MinProd MinProdX MidasProd MidasProdX
latitude 0.198** -0.066*** 0.152* -0.014** 0.195** -0.031*** 0.210*** -0.000
(0.093) (0.023) (0.086) (0.007) (0.076) (0.011) (0.074) (0.001)
ResLat 0.297 0.789*** 2.433*** 0.979*** -0.574 0.803*** 8.970** 1.747***
(0.434) (0.181) (0.864) (0.141) (0.960) (0.256) (4.072) (0.152)
EurFrac 0.094*** 0.004 0.095*** 0.002 0.084*** 0.004 0.091*** 0.000
(0.026) (0.006) (0.026) (0.002) (0.024) (0.003) (0.026) (0.000)
Observations 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Signiﬁcance of instruments:
F(3,70) 6.38 8.22 8.18 16.68 4.99 7.94 8.14 76.39
p − value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is institutions in odd-numbered columns, and the interaction of institutions and natural resources in even-numbered
columns. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Signiﬁcance of instruments reports
the F-test for joint signiﬁcance of excluded instruments. See Section 4 for details.
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1Table B2: First-stage regressions when instrumenting institutions with settler mortality, latitude and fraction
speaking any European language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PrimExp PrimExpX OrMetExp OrMetExpX MinProd MinProdX MidasProd MidasProdX
latitude 0.044 -0.061 -0.035 -0.010 -0.059 -0.036 0.007 -0.002***
(0.153) (0.056) (0.088) (0.009) (0.130) (0.023) (0.088) (0.001)
ResLat 0.387 0.675 4.227*** 0.916*** 1.515 0.661 33.650*** 1.828***
(1.111) (0.500) (1.006) (0.152) (1.542) (0.446) (6.491) (0.109)
EurFrac 0.121** 0.001 0.133** 0.003 0.125** 0.007 0.114** -0.000
(0.056) (0.016) (0.049) (0.005) (0.053) (0.008) (0.053) (0.000)
lsettler -0.061*** 0.001 -0.037* -0.001 -0.028 0.003 -0.038* 0.000
(0.020) (0.007) (0.021) (0.001) (0.021) (0.003) (0.022) (0.000)
ResSet 0.191** -0.009 0.170* 0.007 0.093 -0.051* 2.406*** 0.025**
(0.072) (0.037) (0.096) (0.009) (0.099) (0.026) (0.598) (0.012)
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Signiﬁcance of instruments:
F 2.62 0.64 5.43 10.62 1.36 4.33 6.44 1822.92
p − value 0.039 0.668 0.001 0.000 0.260 0.003 0.000 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is institutions in odd-numbered columns, and the interaction of institutions and natural resources in even-numbered
columns. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Signiﬁcance of instruments reports
the F-test for joint signiﬁcance of excluded instruments. See Section 4 for details.
4
2Table B3: Results when instrumenting for institutions using
settler mortality.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PrimExp OrMetExp MinProd MidasProd
Res 15.654 -36.407* -12.907 -81.665**
(19.030) (20.136) (8.367) (30.608)
Institutions 5.582 0.408 4.067 10.422**
(6.461) (6.577) (6.938) (4.846)
ResInst -34.878 74.139* 21.420 151.961***
(32.018) (39.997) (17.521) (44.199)
GDP75 -1.155 -1.260 -1.732 -2.758***
(1.323) (1.026) (1.312) (0.882)
Openness 0.293 0.233 0.162 0.112
(0.365) (0.416) (0.346) (0.392)
Investments 0.083 0.092** 0.094** 0.071
(0.063) (0.039) (0.043) (0.047)
Observations 50 50 50 50
R2 0.48 0.60 0.65 0.62
Joint(p) 0.150 0.185 0.263 0.002
Ovid 0.318 0.239 0.200 0.086
First-stage results in Appendix Table B2
Notes: Dependent variable is growth. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. All regressions
include a constant term and regional dummies for Latin America and Sub Sa-
haran Africa (not shown). Joint(p) denotes whether the coeﬃcient estimates
of resources, and the interaction of resources and institutions are jointly sig-
niﬁcant. Ovid reports the p-values from the Hansen J-overidentiﬁcation test
for instruments. Hausman reports p-values of the regression-based Hausman
test for endogeneity as explained in the text. The null hypothesis is that
institutions are exogenous.
43Table B4: Dropping and adding control variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MidasProd -95.656*** -99.194*** -96.459*** -99.798*** -133.200***
(27.804) (30.421) (23.472) (22.356) (28.746)
Institutions 5.564*** 4.777*** 6.864*** 7.183*** -0.728
(1.357) (1.559) (1.249) (1.312) (0.889)
ResInst 167.251*** 173.805*** 169.683*** 174.995*** 221.847***
(38.508) (42.496) (32.300) (30.703) (41.842)
GDP75 -2.019*** -2.159*** -1.957*** -2.001***
(0.288) (0.319) (0.296) (0.316)






Observations 80 80 80 80 80
R2 0.70 0.71 0.66 0.65 0.49
Joint(p) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: We add and drop control variables as speciﬁed in Section 3. Column (1) redisplays the
regression reported in column 4 of Table 3. Dependent variable is growth. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. All
regressions include a constant term and regional dummies for Latin America and Sub Saharan
Africa (not shown). Joint(p) denotes whether the coeﬃcient estimates of resources, and the
interaction of resources and institutions are jointly signiﬁcant.
44